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Learning and Selection 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Are learning processes selection processes?  This paper takes a slightly 
modified version of the account of selection presented in Hull, Langman and 
Glenn (2002) and asks whether it applies to learning processes.  The answer 
is that although some learning processes are selectional, many are not.   
This has consequences for teleological theories of mental content.   
According to these theories, mental states have content in virtue of having 
proper functions, and they have proper functions in virtue of being the 
products of selection processes.  For some mental states, it is plausible that 
the relevant selection process is natural selection, but there are many for 
which it is not plausible.  One response to this (due to David Papineau) is to 
suggest that the learning processes by which we acquire non-innate mental 
states are selection processes and can therefore confer proper functions on 
mental states.  This paper considers two ways in which this response could be 
elaborated, and argues that neither of them succeed: the teleosemanticist 
cannot rely on the claim that learning processes are selection processes in 
order to justify the attribution of proper functions to beliefs.   
  
 1. Introduction 
Teleosemanticists claim that beliefs have content because they have proper 
functions of a particular kind, and that they have proper functions in virtue of 
being the products of selection processes.1  But what selection processes?  
Some beliefs, or some tendencies to form certain beliefs under certain 
circumstances, are presumably the products of natural selection.  When a dog 
suddenly growls nearby, I form a belief that causes me to prepare to flee.  
Presumably it is as a result of natural selection that I have the tendency to 
form that belief under those circumstances.  My ancestors had that tendency, 
and it helped them to survive and reproduce: those contemporaries of my 
ancestors who did not have it were more likely to get eaten.    
However, there are many beliefs about which such an evolutionary 
story is completely implausible.  The most striking cases are novel beliefs - 
beliefs about new or newly-discovered things such as jaffas and protons.  The 
tendency to token the belief “This is a jaffa” when eating one cannot be a 
direct product of natural selection.   
In response to the problem of how such beliefs can have proper 
functions, Ruth Millikan argues that beliefs have derived proper functions – 
belief-producing mechanisms have proper functions because they were 
naturally selected for, and beliefs themselves have functions derived from the 
functions of the mechanisms that produce them.2  In contrast, David Papineau 
                                            
1 See for example Papineau 1987, 65: “When we talk of some characteristic C being present 
in order to produce E, we should understand ourselves to be claiming that C is now present 
because of some past selection process that favoured C because it produced E.” 
 
2 See Millikan 1984, 41 – 43. 
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argues that learning processes are selection processes too, and that therefore 
learned beliefs can have direct proper functions.3   
The latter response has a certain immediate appeal.  Selection 
processes confer proper functions on their products; mental states (by 
teleosemantic hypothesis) have proper functions; there is a selectionist strand 
in the psychological literature on belief and concept acquisition; the competing 
Millikanian hypothesis is complex: consequently the hypothesis that mental 
states have proper functions because mental states are acquired via selection 
processes seems worth taking seriously.  However, the hypothesis has never 
been properly evaluated, at least in part because it has never been spelled 
out in any detail.  
This paper elaborates the hypothesis that learning processes are 
selection processes and considers whether or not it is plausible.    Section 2 is 
a discussion of the nature of selection processes: Section 3 considers 
whether or not processes of belief-acquisition and concept-acquisition qualify 
as selection processes.  The verdict is that although some processes of belief-
acquisition may be selectional, many are not, and that there is considerable 
reason to doubt that processes of concept acquisition are selection processes 
either.  Finally, Section 4 explores the consequences of all this for 
teleosemantics: I argue that even if processes of concept acquisition did turn 
out to be selectional, that would not be enough to ground the attribution of 
proper functions to beliefs.  The conclusion is that the teleosemanticist cannot 
solve the problem of ascribing content to non-innate beliefs by appealing to 
the idea that learning processes are selection processes.   
                                            
3 See Papineau 1987, 65 – 67; Papineau 1993, 59. 
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 2. What is a selection process? 
There are a number of things one might mean by “selection process.”  The 
kind of process that is of interest here is the kind that confers proper functions 
on its products.  The proper function of something is what that thing is for:  
what it is supposed to do.  My heart has the proper function of pumping blood: 
my can-opener has the proper function of opening cans.4  Natural selection is 
the paradigm example of a selection process that confers proper functions.  
Other than things that are designed for some purpose, the things that we most 
naturally describe as having a function are biological items like hearts, eyes 
and lungs.   
Not everything something does is its proper function.  Computer 
monitors can be used as door-stops, but that is not what they are for.  My 
heart makes certain noises, but making those noises is not its proper function 
– my heart is for pumping blood.   
An item may not perform its proper function: for example, most sperm 
do not succeed in fertilizing an ovum.  Furthermore, an item may not even 
have the capacity to perform its proper function: a heart so deformed that it 
cannot pump blood still has the function of pumping blood.   
Consequently for any X, we cannot answer the question “What is the 
proper function of X?” simply by talking about what X does or what X has a 
propensity to do.  We cannot even answer it by talking about what useful 
things X does: X may do something useful by accident, as when the Bible in 
the soldier’s breast-pocket stops the bullet and saves his life,  in which case 
                                            
4 The term “proper function” was coined by Ruth Millikan (1984).  There are other kinds of 
function, but in this paper “function” can be taken to mean “proper function,” since proper 
functions are the only kind I am concerned with here.   
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that is not its proper function.  If X is an artifact, we might answer the question 
by talking about what X was designed to do, as opposed to what it fortuitously 
happens to do.  But unless we are creationists, we cannot take this line in 
talking about the proper function of the heart or the lungs or (supposing that 
beliefs have proper functions) the belief that it is raining.  
The prevailing analysis of the proper functions of biological items is in 
terms of natural selection.  Here is Karen Neander’s version of it: 
It is the/a proper function of an item (X) of an organism (O) to do that 
which items of X's type did to contribute to the inclusive fitness of O's 
ancestors, and which caused the genotype, of which X is the 
phenotypic expression, to be selected by natural selection. (Neander 
1991, 74) 
 
It is likely that pumping blood particularly well or efficiently is what the hearts 
of my ancestors did which helped my ancestors out-reproduce those of their 
conspecifics who did not have such efficient blood-pumps.   The function of 
my heart is therefore to pump blood. 
In order to generalize this account so that it covers the proper functions 
of items that are not the direct products of natural selection, we need a 
general characterization of selection processes.  There is reason to want such 
a general characterization quite independently of any interest in 
teleosemantics.  There are a number of examples of function-conferring 
processes which have many characteristics in common with natural selection: 
for example, the process by which antibody-producing cells proliferate 
differentially in response to the presence of a virus (see Darden and Cain 
(1989), Piatelli-Palmarini (1989), and Hull et al (2001)) and processes by 
which artefacts acquire functions independent of the intentions of their 
designer or creator.  A general account of selection processes which covered 
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these cases as well as natural selection would be of great interest.    
David Hull, Rodney Langman and Sigrid Glenn provide such a general 
characterization in “A general account of selection: Biology, immunology, and 
behavior,” 2001.  I shall modify their account slightly, and use the modified 
version in considering whether learning processes are selection processes. 
According to Hull et al., a selection process consists of:  
repeated cycles of replication, variation and environmental interaction 
so structured that environmental interaction causes replication to be 
differential.  The net effect is the evolution of the lineages produced by 
this process. (513)   
As Hull et al. point out, this characterization of selection processes needs 
careful explication.     
Variation is necessary for selection: without it, there would be no 
alternatives to be selected between.  And environmental interaction is 
necessary:  variations between items must cause differences in their 
interactions with their environment such that some of them will be more 
successful at replicating themselves than others.   
Some kind of copying or reproduction or replication is necessary for 
selection.  Here it is important to distinguish selection processes, which are 
iterated processes that confer proper functions, from one-shot sorting 
processes that do not.  Imagine a population of non-reproducing individuals 
that vary in ways that matter to how long each one survives.  Suppose they 
are rocks on a beach varying with respect to their hardness, and that how long 
a rock survives before being turned into sand by the action of the waves 
depends (in part) on the hardness of that rock.  This is a sorting process: over 
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time, environmental conditions sort the harder rocks from the others.  But it is 
not a selection process in the sense we are considering here.  Neither does it 
confer proper functions.  We are not inclined to say that the hardness of a 
rock is for enabling the rock to survive the action of the waves, or that the rock 
is hard in order to enable it to survive the action of the waves – the hardness 
of the rock is not for anything at all.   The reason is that in this case there are 
no iterated cycles of replication.  If rocks reproduced, and if surviving longer 
as a result of their hardness enabled them to reproduce more successfully, 
and if hardness were a heritable characteristic of rocks, then it would make 
sense to say that the hardness of a current rock had a proper function.  There 
would be a selectional explanation of its hardness in terms of how hardness 
had enabled its ancestors to reproduce more successfully than other rocks. In 
the absence of cycles of replication, however, no such explanation is 
available.  In the case of a one-shot sorting process, there is no lineage about 
which we could say that the later items in the lineage have the characteristics 
they do because of the ways in which those characteristics increased the 
reproductive success of the earlier items in the lineage.   
 There remains the question of what counts as replication, and indeed 
whether or not replication is a concept that should be appealed to in the 
characterization of selection processes. As the term is standardly used, 
replication requires a very high degree of fidelity of copying, whereas all that is 
required for a selection process is some kind of inheritance across 
generations (see Godfrey-Smith 2001, 538).  What we need is an account of 
the conditions under which an item counts as a copy of, or a descendant of, or 
a member of the same lineage as another item.  We have a good enough 
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handle on this for the case of evolution by natural selection, but we do not 
have the general account of what I shall call “copying” that is required for a 
general characterization of selection processes.   If we are considering 
whether a particular instance of a pigeon pecking a button is in any interesting 
sense a descendant or copy of an earlier pecking of that button by that 
pigeon, or whether a particular tokening of a belief is a copy of an earlier 
tokening of that belief, we need a specification of the conditions under which 
an item counts as a copy of or a descendant of another item. 
 As Godfrey-Smith (2001, 538) says, all that is required is “a systematic 
correlation between parent and offspring.”   However, for this to be useful in 
the characterization of selection processes in general, we need to specify 
what count as “parents” and “offspring” when we use those terms outside of 
the biological domain in which their meaning is obvious.   
  I do not propose a complete analysis of the generalized 
copy/descendant relation here.  Rather, I will provisionally adopt the following 
intuitively plausible set of necessary conditions, which I take to be a first step 
towards such an analysis.  
If B is a copy or descendant of A then:   
1) A and B have some properties in common  
2) A causes B to come into existence      
3) For some of the properties A and B have in common, it is the case 
that if A had not had those properties, B would not have them. 
These conditions are too general to be jointly sufficient for B’s being a copy or 
descendant of A.  Suppose the food I ate last week gave me the energy to 
acquire food this week: what is in my digestive tract this week (B) is not a 
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copy of what was in it last week (A), although all of conditions 1 – 3 are 
satisfied.5   However, in any case in which one or more of these conditions is 
not satisfied, B is not a copy or descendant of A.   
In the sections which follow, I consider which (if any) learning 
processes are selection processes.  I will use the Hull et al. characterization of 
selection processes, but with one modification; I allow lower-fidelity copying 
than is suggested by their use of the term “replication.”  
 
 
3. Are learning processes selection processes?   
 
David Papineau appeals to the idea that learning processes are selection 
processes in order to explain how it is that non-innate beliefs can have proper 
functions (Papineau 1993, 59).  There are two ways in which the idea that 
learning processes are selection processes might be spelled out, either of 
which might be thought to ground the ascription of proper functions to beliefs.   
1) Belief-acquisition is a selection process and therefore beliefs have 
proper functions.   
2) Belief-acquisition is not a selection process but concept-acquisition is.  
Concepts have proper functions because they are the products of a 
selection process, and beliefs have proper functions because they are 
composed of concepts.   
I am not concerned about which of these Papineau would defend: some of his 
statements about learning and selection suggest the first and others the 
                                            
5 The example is appropriated, with thanks, from an anonymous referee for Biology and 
Philosophy.   
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second.  Rather, my interest is in whether either of them can succeed as a 
strategy for ascribing functions and therefore content to non-innate beliefs. 
Section 3.1 is a discussion of operant conditioning, which is the kind of 
learning that looks most like a selection process.  Section 3.2. considers 
processes of belief acquisition in general and whether they are selectional, 
and Section 3.3. considers what concept acquisition processes would have to 
be like if they were to be selectional.   
 
3.1. Operant Conditioning 
If you put a pigeon in a box in which there are a range of objects with 
which it can interact, including a button which when pecked causes pigeon 
food to appear, the pigeon initially performs a wide range of behaviors, 
accidentally acquiring food occasionally when it happens to peck the button.  
Gradually the frequency with which the pigeon pecks the button increases.  
The pigeon learns that pecking the button gets it food and so does it more 
often.   
Here, the items that appear to differentially replicate are behaviors.  
The pigeon displays a range of different behaviours: button-pecking, floor 
scratching, and so on.  Interactions with the environment cause some of these 
behaviors to be repeated with increasing frequency while others are not.  
Because of the way the environment is set up, button-peckings get the pigeon 
food and other behaviours do not, so button-pecking behavior proliferates and 
other behaviors decrease in frequency. Operant conditioning seems to fit the 
criteria for being a selection process: there are “repeated cycles of replication, 
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variation and environmental interaction so structured that environmental 
interaction causes replication to be differential.” 6   
David Papineau gives only one example of a human learning process 
which he takes to be selectional, and as described by him, it sounds like an 
operant conditioning process.  A child, Papineau thinks, gets positive 
feedback when he has a belief that leads him to say something approximating 
“blue” when pointing at things that are blue.  Thus the tendency to token 
beliefs that lead to the utterance of “blue” in the presence of blue things gets 
“fixed,” while the tendency to token beliefs that lead to the utterance of (for 
example) “red” in those situations is lost (Papineau 1987, 67). This sounds a 
lot like the process the pigeon goes through. 
What is the belief (or the belief/circumstance pair) that allegedly gets 
reinforced in this case?  You might think that it is a belief about the colour of 
something - the belief that the object in front of the child is blue - or more 
precisely the tendency to token that belief when the object in front of the child 
is in fact blue.  But this cannot be right, because children develop the ability to 
categorize things by colour much too early.  Children have colour concepts 
long before they have words for them and long before they can understand 
other people’s words for them. (See Bornstein 1985, 121-123.)  Presumably 
children form beliefs about which objects belong to which colour categories 
before there is any reinforcement (at least of the kind Papineau discusses) for 
having them - the ability of a four-month-old infant to distinguish colours does 
not have any effects that will enable people to give the appropriate feedback.  
The Papineau story is a hypothesis about what happens later, when the child 
                                            
6 For more detail on operant conditioning as a selection process, see Hull et al 2001, 521-526. 
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acquires the rudiments of speech. 
The belief in question, then, must be a different one: the belief that 
“blue” (the utterance) means blueness (the property), or that “blue” (the 
utterance) expresses <blue> (the concept).  The belief allegedly reinforced 
must be a belief about language.   
This story about the acquisition of the vocabulary of a first language 
has some initial plausibility.  A child learning a new word does appear to utter 
it every time it comes into his head that the object he is looking at is one that 
the word applies to, and often, parents smile and say “Yes, it’s blue” every 
time the child gets it right.  However, the conditioning model of vocabulary- 
acquisition was thoroughly discredited by Chomsky in his 1959 review of B.F. 
Skinner’s Verbal Behavior (along with, more famously, the parallel model of 
grammar-acquisition).   Although parents often provide the kind of feedback 
Papineau suggests, children do not need it – they accquire the vocabulary of 
their first language perfectly well without it, unless you lock them in a 
cupboard and never talk to them at all.   Operant conditioning may well be a 
selection process.  But Papineau’s putative example of learning as a selection 
process is not convincing, and it is the only example he provides.   
 
3.2. Is belief acquisition a selection process? 
Even if language-acquisition is not a selection process, belief-acquisition in 
general might be.  Let’s look first at an example of the kind of belief-
acquisition that looks on the face of it most like a selection process; trial and 
error learning.   
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Suppose I learn, in the course of five years, how to grow good 
tomatoes in my garden.  The method is to increase the acidity of the soil and 
also add nutrients, and plant tomato seedlings of Variety A.  In the process of 
discovering this, I try out numerous other possibilities. I try leaving the soil 
untreated, I try increasing the acidity of the soil but not adding nutrients.  I try 
other tomato varieties.  
Suppose that each of my actions is based on a hypothesis about what 
will produce good tomatoes.   
P = Variety A will thrive in the initial condition of the garden 
Q = Variety B will thrive in the initial condition of the garden 
P1 = A will thrive if the acidity of the soil is increased  
P2 = A will thrive if the acidity of the soil  is decreased 
P3 = A will thrive if the acidity is increased and nutrients are added 
The hypothesis I end up believing is P3.  P3 is a member (the last member) of 
a lineage of hypotheses: it is a modification of P1, which in turn is a 
modification of P.   
Let’s set the example up to look as much as possible like a selection 
process.  Suppose that first I planted a couple of varieties of seedlings, A and 
B, and did not add anything to the soil.  Then I abandoned the variety that did 
less well, Variety B: hypothesis Q had no descendant hypotheses.  Variety A 
did better, but not well enough: hypothesis P generated two modifications, P1 
and P2, which I tested in different parts of the garden.  Decreasing the acidity 
made the plants grow less well: hypothesis P2 was abandoned and had no 
descendants.  Increasing the acidity improved the tomatoes, although not 
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enough: P1 was modified to P3, and when no disconfirming evidence 
emerged over several trials, P3 became a belief.   
 
    P3 
P1 
 
P 
 
  P2 
 
Q 
 
This is a simplified example.  There could be more varieties, and there 
could be more stages in the sequence.  But at some point, since we are 
talking about a process of belief formation, some hypothesis must turn into a 
belief.  And, if it is to look at all like a selection process, at each point acting 
on a hypothesis must have some positive outcome if that hypothesis is to be 
modified rather than abandoned.  (There are lots of ways the learning process 
might go which would not satisfy this constraint.  I might perfectly sensibly 
think that the fact that Variety A does better than Variety B in untreated soil is 
not a reason to think that it will do better in treated soil, in which case 
Hypothesis Q might have descendants parallel to those of Hypothesis P.)   
 Is the process described above a selection process?  Recall that a 
selection process consists of “repeated cycles of replication, variation and 
environmental interaction so structured that environmental interaction causes 
replication to be differential”  (Hull et al. 2001, 513).  In the example described 
above, what is it that reproduces, interacts with the environment, and varies in 
ways which are heritable and which affect its environmental interactions and 
(consequently) its reproductive success?  There are a number of possible 
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candidates.  The most obvious one is that it is hypotheses which reproduce 
(with modifications).   
 The idea that in this example we have a lineage of hypotheses, with P3 
being a descendant of P1 which in turn is a descendant of P, seems 
consistent with our very general characterisation of the ancestor/descendant 
relation.  P3 is like P1 in that both say that if some set of conditions obtain, 
then the tomato plants will thrive, and both include amongst the conditions  
various of the unspecified conditions initially prevailing in the garden (all of 
them except the acidity and nutrient content of the soil) modified by increasing 
the acidity of the soil.   They differ in that P3 but not P1 includes among the 
conditions the addition of nutrients to the soil.  At each point there is a 
population (in this simplified example an unrealistically small population) of 
varying hypotheses which interact with the environment by causing different 
behaviour in the gardener who is entertaining the hypotheses.  The 
differences between the hypotheses cause the interactions with the 
environment to differ in ways which make a difference to the reproductive 
success of the hypotheses.  P2 does not spawn any modified versions of itself 
- it is the end of its lineage – because it causes the gardener to decrease the 
acidity of the soil and the tomato plants do not thrive.  P1, on the other hand, 
causes the gardener to increase the acidity, the plants do better, and P1 is 
modified to P3: P1 is more reproductively successful than P2.  So far so good.  
At this point an oddity arises.  P3 does not spawn any successor hypotheses, 
not because it is abandoned (like P2)  but because, rather than being 
modified, it becomes a belief.  It is not reproductively successful at all, since 
reproduction for a hypothesis involves spawning modified versions of oneself.   
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 There are a number of possible responses to this.  One is to deny that 
it is a problem.  On this story, the belief that Variety A will thrive if the acidity is 
increased and nutrients are added is the product of a selection process, and 
there is no need to claim that once the belief is in place it is maintained by a 
selection process.  However, P3 does not become a belief immediately it is 
entertained.  Part of the process of belief formation by trial and error involves 
a hypothesis surviving the kind of tests that its ancestor hypotheses failed.  
But at this point in the process the hypothesis is not reproductively successful 
at all.  It is doing well at surviving: but it is reproductive success rather than 
survival which is required for the process  to be a selection process.    
 There are a couple of candidates other than hypotheses for the role of 
being the thing that reproduces and interacts with the environment in 
processes of trial and error learning.  Neither of them runs into this particular 
problem: both of them continue to reproduce even after competing 
hypotheses have dropped out of the picture.  The first candidate is 
behaviours; the second is what might be called occurrent beliefs or occurrent 
hypotheses – particular tokenings or callings to mind of a standing belief or a 
standing hypothesis.  Perhaps each planting of seedlings of Variety A in 
treated soil is a descendant of the previous planting.  Or perhaps what 
reproduces is the thing which presumably precedes each instance of that 
behaviour: the calling to mind of the standing hypothesis (or, later in the 
process, belief) that planting seedlings of Variety A in treated soil will produce 
good tomatoes.   
There is an apparent problem with both of these suggestions.  
Instances of the behaviour, one might think, are not in fact copies of each 
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other: one year’s planting is not the cause of the next year’s.  Rather, they 
have a common cause, an inner state, the belief or hypothesis that planting in 
this way will produce good tomatoes.  (Note, however, that this will be true in 
the pigeon case as well, unless philosophical behaviorism is true of pigeons.)   
Likewise with occurrent beliefs or occurrent hypotheses: when, in the spring of 
2007,  I call to mind my standing belief that this is how to produce good 
tomatoes, that event is not a copy of 2006’s calling to mind of the same belief.  
Rather, the two callings-to-mind have the same underlying cause. One red 
blood cell is not a descendant of an earlier red blood cell in virtue of having 
been produced later by the same bone marrow.  Likewise, one might think, 
one occurrence of a belief is not a descendant of an earlier one in virtue of 
having been produced later by the same standing state.   
However, recall how inclusive our characterisation of the 
ancestor/descendant relation is.  Consider also a case which it seems clear 
should be covered by it: the case of biological organs, or phenotypic traits 
more generally.  There is a sense in which my mother’s heart and my heart 
are members of the same lineage, even though her heart did not directly 
cause mine to come into existence, even though this too could be seen as a 
case in which the two have a common cause.7  This had better count as a 
case of the ancestor/descendant relation, since such traits are the paradigm 
case of things which have proper functions as a result of being produced by 
selection processes.   
Consequently, pending a more precise characterisation of the 
ancestor/descendant relation, we should say that cases of trial and error 
                                            
7 Thanks to Kim Sterelny for this point.  
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learning such as the one described above may be selection processes.  Note, 
however, how carefully you have to set up your example to make it plausible 
that it is an example of a selection process, and how difficult it is, even then, 
to make the case. Anyone who claims some process is a selection process 
needs to specify what it is, in that process, that reproduces and forms a 
lineage, and even given a very inclusive characterisation of reproduction, this 
may not be easily done. 
Even if we grant that processes of trial and error learning are 
sometimes selection processes, many instances of belief acquisition do not 
involve trial and error learning, and do not even on the face of it appear to be 
selectional.  Often we acquire information by being told things by reliable 
people or reading them in reputable books, rather than by entertaining a 
number of hypotheses until one turns out to be more useful than the others.   
Consider my acquisition of the belief that Paris is the capital of France.  I 
perceived the sequence of symbols “Paris is the capital of France” on a page.  
On its way to storage in my long-term memory, some elements of my 
representation of it were discarded – the font, for example, and the colour of 
the type.  What remains is a memory of the proposition expressed by the 
sentence, and perhaps also the memory that I found out that Paris is the 
capital of France while reading book X in place Y. 
One difference between operant conditioning situations and this kind of 
human learning situation is the lack of immediate pay-off in most human 
learning situations.  Much human learning seems to be a process of gathering 
information about the environment without any short-term benefits - 
information is acquired which is of no immediate use.  This is very different 
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from the animal learning which conforms to an operant conditioning model - 
there, the benefits have to be relatively short-term or else the behavior does 
not get reinforced.  Animals learn things that are relevant to their current 
situation.  Humans, apparently, sometimes acquire information that is of no 
benefit at all, long-term or short-term. 
It may be, however, that there are internal benefits to acquiring 
apparently useless information.  We might be hardwired to get satisfaction 
from acquiring new beliefs, or (more narrowly, and more usefully) from 
acquiring new beliefs that we take to be well-confirmed.   
Whether or not this is so, the process by which I acquired the belief that 
Paris is the capital of France is not a selection process, even though relevant 
information is sorted out from irrelevant.  There is no consideration of 
alternative hypotheses – what is discarded is information like the position of 
the sentence “Paris is the capital of France” on the page, rather than 
candidates for belief such as “Paris is the capital of Spain” and “London is the 
capital of France.”   Although in some cases alternative hypotheses such as 
these may have been present in advance and the effect of testimony from a 
reliable source is to select between them, there are many cases in which no 
hypotheses on the subject were entertained prior to the testimony that causes 
you to form the belief.8   
                                            
8 Scott Soames (1989, 589) argues that I can acquire a belief such as the belief that Paris is 
the capital of France simply by hearing, understanding and accepting a sentence that 
expresses it. I may need to know that "Paris" and "France", say, are names (maybe even that 
they are place names) and I may also need to know roughly what it means for something to 
be the capital of something else, but our syntactic competence will do the rest. On hearing, 
understanding and accepting the sentence "Paris is the capital of France", I come to hold a 
belief, whether or not I know where Paris or France is. If Soames is right that we do 
sometimes gain beliefs in this way, then such acquisition processes are good examples of 
ones that do not involve discarding alternative hypotheses. 
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I take this to show that although some of the processes by which we 
acquire beliefs may be selection processes, many of them are not.  Operant 
conditioning may well be a selection process, but most human belief 
acquisition does not occur by means of operant conditioning.  Trial and error 
learning in general has many of the characteristics of a selection process, and 
in some cases, provided we can specify what it is that reproduces and 
interacts with the environment in ways which affect its reproductive success, it 
may be a selection process. However, many of our beliefs are formed as a 
result of testimony from sources we take to be reliable, and the process by 
which this occurs is definitely not a selection process.  So the claim that 
processes of belief acquisition are selection processes cannot be used by the 
teleosemanticist as a general explanation of how non-innate beliefs get to 
have proper functions. 
 
 
3.3. Is concept acquisition a selection process?   
There is, as yet, no consensus in psychology about how infants acquire 
concepts.  In this section I will consider what concept acquisition would have 
to be like if it were to be a selection process, and raise some problems which 
an account of concept acquisition as a selection process would have to 
surmount. 
Suppose we are born with some concepts already in place.  (For 
example, Elizabeth Spelke (1985) argues that neonates already have the 
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notion of a physical object.)  Then the question is, how do we acquire further 
ways of categorizing the objects we perceive?  The point made earlier about 
colour concepts is true for a wide range of concepts - language acquisition 
alters some categorizations, but infants begin to categorize things before they 
begin to understand speech and long before they begin to speak themselves. 
(See Hayne 1996, 113.)    
Some cognitive scientists, for example Massimo Piatelli-Palmerini, 
describe their theories of concept acquisition as selectional (as opposed to 
instructional) theories.  Piatelli-Palmerini argues that there is an array of 
“highly specific dispositions and structures already present in the organism 
before any encounter with the outside world” (Piatelli-Palmerini 1989, 4), and 
that which of these are fixed or developed depends on which environmental 
conditions are encountered.  However, it is not clear that this is a selection 
process rather than a mere sorting process.   
For the process of concept acquisition to be a selection process, there 
would have to be reproducing entities that varied, and their variations would 
have to influence the success with which they reproduce.   Suppose, then, 
that different categorizations of objects are the entities in question, and that 
we start out by categorizing objects rather indiscriminately in a wide range of 
ways.  Some of these ways of categorizing lead to better consequences than 
others, so they are the ones that continue to be used.   
What would the function of a concept be – what might a concept be 
selected for?  On the face of it, a concept on its own confers no advantage on 
its possessor: it is only the fact that we can stick our concepts together to form 
representations of states of affairs that makes concepts useful.  If concepts 
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are selected, it must be because of the beliefs and desires they enable their 
possessor to form.  A concept must be part of an intentional state, and the 
intentional state must play a role in causing behaviour, before there could be 
selection for possession of a particular concept.  Having concepts enables us 
to form beliefs and desires, and beliefs and desires are what enable us to 
negotiate our environment and what cause us to try to change it.   
Given this, it might be thought that infant concept-acquisition cannot be 
a selection process, since infants acquire concepts before they are capable of 
doing much behaving.  The good consequences that would account for the 
fixation of one concept rather than another are not going to be pats on the 
head when you get it right.  So, as with belief acquisition, there is a prima 
facie problem with regarding concept acquisition during infancy as a selection 
process.   It looks as though in many cases concepts are acquired but not 
used until later - they are acquired for their own sake, without identifiable 
immediate rewards. 
However, there are a couple of reasons to doubt that this is so.  One is 
that that infants do in fact engage in subtle forms of social behaviour; it has 
been argued that this increases their fitness  (Hrdy 1999, 483).  Another is 
that, as suggested above, not all rewards need come in the form of external 
feedback: concept-formation may have internal rewards.  Certain ways of 
categorizing things may be more satisfying than others.  Perhaps infants get 
pleasure from carving up their environment more finely.  Or perhaps they get 
pleasure from being able to perform cognitive tasks for which carving up their 
environment more finely is a prerequisite, whether or not this cognitive 
processing has any manifest effect on their behaviour.  This is pure 
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speculation – the question is an empirical one, and the research has not been 
done – but it seems possible and even plausible that they might.  
Again, however, it is not clear that there is any reproduction or copying 
going on here.  As the story is told by Piatelli-Palmerini and other 
selectionists, there is a population of protoconcepts, or dispositions and 
structures, and the environment sorts them, causing some to be perpetuated 
and others to disappear, but nothing proliferates. 
A selectionist might hope to avoid this problem by considering 
tokenings of concepts rather than concepts themselves: perhaps my tokening 
of the concept “blue” when I see something blue can be seen as a 
descendant of my earlier tokenings of the concept.  Then the same issues 
arise as in the case of belief acquisition: the selectionist needs a more precise 
specification of the ancestor/descendant relation in order to make the case 
that tokenings of concepts bear this relation to each other.   
I take this to be a challenge to anyone who claims that processes of 
concept acquisition are selection processes: a challenge to spell out the 
details of what the relevant lineages are.  The important point is that to claim 
that a process is a selection process is to claim more than simply that it is a 
sorting process: it must also be a process which includes reproduction and 
differential reproductive success.   
 
4.   Where does this leave the teleosemanticist? 
The first suggestion as to how the teleosemanticist might develop the idea 
that learning processes are selection processes failed: even if some of the 
processes by which we acquire beliefs are selection processes, not enough of 
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them are for the teleosemanticist’s purposes.  The second suggestion was 
that concept acquisition might be a selection process that would give concepts 
proper functions, and beliefs might then have proper functions in virtue of 
being composed of concepts.   
I have argued that the claim that concept acquisition is a selection 
process requires the specification of what replicates or is copied in the 
process of concept acquisition.  Further, I have suggested that this is not a 
straightforward matter.  But even if concept acquisition did turn out to be a 
selection process the second teleosemantic strategy would not work, because 
proper functions are not compositional: the proper function of a complex item 
is not a function (in the mathematical sense) of the proper functions of its 
parts.   
Recall that according to the view we are currently considering, beliefs 
are not the products of selection processes but concepts are.  Consequently 
on this view concepts have proper functions, and, the claim is, since beliefs 
are composed of concepts beliefs have proper functions too.  My belief that 
snow is white has as its components the concept of snow, the concept of 
whiteness and the concept of predication.  The claim is that the belief has a 
proper function because those component concepts do.  
It is uncontroversial that a belief’s content depends on the content of its 
constituent concepts.  However, unlike meanings, proper functions do not 
compose in this way.  As Peter Godfrey-Smith (1996, 677) puts it, you cannot 
“read off” the function of a device from the functions of its component parts.  
And something cannot acquire a proper function simply in virtue of its parts 
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having proper functions, if it is not itself the product of a selection process or 
of design.   
 Consider my can-opener, which has the function of opening cans.  Its 
component parts each have their own function. There is a circular blade, 
which has the function of cutting through the top of the can: there is a handle, 
which has the function of turning a cog, which has the function of turning the 
blade.  Suppose that the can-opener was neither designed to open cans nor 
selected for opening cans.  Could it be the case that it nevertheless had the 
function of opening cans in virtue of the functions of its parts? 
 It is difficult to think of a plausible situation in which the parts would 
have proper functions as a result of either design or selection but the whole 
device would not itself have a proper function as a result of design or 
selection.  Consider, perhaps, a situation in which the parts are removed from 
other devices and accidentally come together into a device which opens cans 
(cf Godfrey-Smith 1996, 677-678).  Could the device have the function of 
opening cans purely in virtue of the functions of its parts?  The answer is 
clearly “no.”  The handle has the function of turning the cog and the cog has 
the function of turning the blade and the blade has the function of cutting 
through the top of the can.  That is what they are for.  But the whole device is 
not for anything – if its parts perform their functions, it will in fact open cans, 
but that will not be its proper function. 
The fact that a complex item is composed of items that have proper 
functions does not suffice to give the complex item itself a proper function.  
Thus even if concepts had proper functions because they were acquired by a 
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selection process, that on its own would not ground the ascription of proper 
functions to beliefs.   
 Consequently the attempt to defend the claim that non-innate beliefs 
have proper functions via defending the claim that learning processes are 
selection processes fails.  Many processes of belief acquisition are not 
selection processes.  There is reason to think that the processes by which we 
acquire concepts are not selection processes either, but even if they are, that 
will only ground the ascription of proper functions to concepts, not to beliefs.  
The teleosemanticist needs another way of ascribing proper functions to 
beliefs.  
 
5. Conclusion 
What options remain open to the teleosemanticist?  One alternative, as 
suggested in Section 1, is the path taken by Ruth Millikan.  According to 
Millikan, belief-forming mechanisms have proper functions as a result of 
natural selection, and beliefs themselves have proper functions not directly, 
because they are themselves the products of some selection process, but 
indirectly, because they are the products of mechanisms which have proper 
functions.   
There is another option, which does not ground the ascription of proper 
functions to beliefs but might nevertheless form the basis of a kind of 
teleosemantics.  If it should turn out that concepts are acquired by selection 
processes, then concepts can have proper functions, so (if these functions are 
of the right kind) concepts can have content.  Then it might be that even if 
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beliefs do not themselves have proper functions, they have content because 
they are composed of concepts that have content.  
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